CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture
ISSN 1481-4374
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University
Volume 23

(2021) Issue 2

Article 5

“Passive Revolutions” after the Crisis of Globalization: Gramsci and the Current Culture of
Populism
Yuri Brunello
Universidade Federal do Ceara

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb
Part of the American Studies Commons, Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, European Languages and Societies Commons,
Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons, and the Sociology of Culture Commons
Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, Purdue University Press selects, develops, and distributes
quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health,
veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences.

CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and
social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural
studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English
Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index
(Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of
America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative
Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu>

Recommended Citation
Brunello, Yuri. "“Passive Revolutions” after the Crisis of Globalization: Gramsci and the Current Culture of Populism."
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23.2 (2021): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.3779>
This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field.
The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 0 times as of 03/08/
22.

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact
epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.
This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for
access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of articles. This journal is
covered under the CC BY-NC-ND license.

UNIVERSITY PRESS <http://www.thepress.purdue.edu>

CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture
ISSN 1481-4374 <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb>
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the
humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature
and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." In addition to the publication of articles,
the journal publishes review articles of scholarly books and publishes research material in its Library Series.
Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and Literature (ChadwyckHealey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index (Wilson), Humanities
International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of America, and
Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative
Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu>

Volume 23 Issue 2 (June 2021) Article 5
Yuri Brunello,
"‘Passive Revolutions’ after the Crisis of Globalization: Gramsci and the Current Culture of
Populism"
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss2/5>
Contents of CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23.2 (2021)
Special Issue: A Return to the Bad Old Times. Ed. Fabio Akcelrud Durão and Fernando Urueta
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss2/>

Abstract: This article compares the ways in which two scholars, the anthropologist Kate Crehan and
the philosopher Diego Fusaro, analyze Gramsci’s thought, verifying its current relevance and
effectiveness in interpreting populism. In Crehan’s recent Gramscian studies the categories of senso
comune and buon senso become crucial. Crehan utilizes categories such as “culture” and senso comune
to explain both the Tea Party experience and Donald Trump’s election. Fusaro, on the contrary, is an
Italian public intellectual who declares himself a sovereignist and who often includes, among the
theoretical references of Italian contemporary sovereignism, the author of Quaderni del carcere. In the
book Antonio Gramsci: la passione di essere nel mondo, Fusaro aims to demonstrate how Gramsci’s
reflections arise within the theoretical horizon of philosophical idealism, both as regards his views on
politics and the economy and his conception of culture: in Fusaro’s opinion, Gramsci is still relevant
today because he is anti-capitalist and because he is not hostile, idealistically, to the family and to the
establishment of a popular and national state. However, a limitation of Antonio Gramsci: la passione di
essere nel mondo is the reductiveness of Gramsci’s conception of culture.
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Yuri BRUNELLO
“Passive Revolutions” after the Crisis of Globalization: Gramsci and the Current Culture of
Populism
1. Trump’s Election as Passive Revolution
The day of Donald Trump's electoral triumph, the then vice president of Bolivia and Marxist intellectual
Alvaro Garcia Linera defined the election of Trump in these terms: “the voters’ endorsement of Mr.
Trump’s populist message shows how Americans, too, are questioning prevailing economic paradigms
in ‘a passive revolution,’ this time coming from the right” (New York Times 2016). “Passive revolution”
is a Gramscian concept of great importance in Prison Notebooks, indicating a cultural, political, and
economic transformation that is only apparent, because it occurred from above, without the participation
of the subordinate classes. A passive revolution includes some progressive elements, but they are not
decisive. As Gramsci observes:
il “progresso” si verificherebbe come reazione delle classi dominanti al sovversivismo sporadico e disorganico
delle masse popolari con “restaurazioni” che accolgono una qualche parte delle esigenze popolari, quindi
“restaurazioni progressive” o “rivoluzioni-restaurazioni” o anche “rivoluzioni passive” (Quaderni 957)
[that “progress” occurs as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic and incoherent rebelliousness
of the popular masses—a reaction consisting of “restorations” that agree to some part of the popular demands
and are therefore “progressive restorations,” or “revolutions-restorations,” or even “passive revolutions.”
(Prison Notebooks III, 252)]

Passive revolution is an organic phenomenon: it is economic, political, and cultural. “Revolutionsrestorations” entails that supremacy continues to be exercised by the ancient ruling classes, even if it
is expressed through, to quote anthropologist Kate Crehan, new “hegemonic narratives” (Gramsci’s
Common 52). In 2002, Crehan dedicated to culture, from a Gramscian perspective, the monograph
Gramsci, Culture, and Anthropology, a study on the different conceptions of culture present in Gramsci’s
writings, from his early contributions to the mature reflections of Prison Notebooks, which stood out
because they deepen aspects of Gramscian thought that until then had not been adequately unpacked.
Crehan’s attention in recent years has focused on populism and its narratives, interpreted in light of the
Gramscian conception of culture present in Prison Notebooks. The Tea Party phenomenon is among the
many topics analyzed in Gramsci’s Common Sense: Inequality and Its Narratives. In the 2018 work,
The Common Sense of Donald J. Trump: A Gramscian Reading of Twenty-First Century Populist Rhetoric,
Crehan explores the formation of Trumpism, which made his election as the 45th President of the United
States possible.
In these works, the anthropologist shows in a compelling way how some categories of Gramsci,
elaborated in Prison Notebooks, are useful for interpreting populism. The theme of “hegemonic
narratives” occupies a considerable space. In her critical investigation, Crehan proceeds by focusing on
an analysis of culture, whereby populism has arrived at the elements through which to effectively
articulate itself. Crehan conceives culture as Gramsci conceives it in Prison Notebooks: “Culture, for
Gramsci, names shared ways of being and living that have come into existence as a result of the
interaction of a myriad of historical forces, and that remain subject to history” (Gramsci’s Common 53).
From the perspective of his Prison Notebooks, which differs from that of his pre-prison writings, the idea
of “culture,” in the singular, also presupposes a plural perspective, the presence of different cultures
and their combination. The situation to which Gramsci refers is, however, chaotic and fragmentary:
“Certain cultures may appear to persist unchanged for long periods of time, nonetheless they are always
inherently in flux: coming into being, undergoing transformation, passing away” (Gramsci’s Common
53).
2. Kate Crehan and the Gramscian exegesis of senso comune and buon senso
Why does Crehan emphasize “hegemonic narratives”? There is no doubt that the discursive dimension
is important in Gramsci. It is intertwined with the problem of hegemony, conceived in Prison Notebooks
as that ideology or that set of ideologies, which—within a society—
tende a prevalere, a imporsi, a diffondersi su tutta l’area, determinando oltre che l’unità economica e politica
anche l’unità intellettuale e morale, su un piano non corporativo, ma universale, di egemonia di un
raggruppamento sociale fondamentale su i raggruppamenti subordinati. (Quaderni 457-458)
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[tends to prevail, to dominate, to spread across the entire field, bringing about, in addition to economic and
political unity, intellectual and moral unity, not on a corporate but on a universal level: the hegemony of a
fundamental social group over the subordinate groups. ( Prison Notebooks. II, 180)]

These Gramscian considerations and their references to the spheres of politics and economics clearly
show that hegemony is more than a mere rhetorical strategy. Crehan is aware of this and takes such a
consideration into account, differentiating herself in this point from post-Gramscians like the philosopher
Ernesto Laclau.
In her approach to Trump, Crehan does not explicitly mention a “passive revolution,” a category that
in Prison Notebooks is reserved for the Italian Risorgimento, fascism, and Fordism; instead, she makes
use of two concepts of Gramsci in a pertinent and fruitful way, senso comune and buon senso:
[T]he standard translation, common sense, is a mistranslation […]. For the English-speaker, common sense
came to denote, in the words of the OED, “good sound practical sense; combined tact and readiness in dealing
with the every-day affairs of life; general sagacity.” Senso comune, by contrast, is a more neutral term that
lacks these strong positive connotations, referring rather to the beliefs and opinions held in common, or
thought to be held in common, by the mass of the population (Gramsci’s Common 43-44).

Senso comune and buon senso (good sense) are both tangential to the category of passive revolution.
In the 2010s, the hegemony of the populist vision became evident with Donald Trump’s election victory,
even though organic elements of Trumpian populism had long been present in the culture of the United
States. The Gramscian senso comune is particularly useful for explaining the dynamic articulations that
characterize a particular cultural context. Senso comune, according to Gramsci,
è la “filosofia dei non filosofi,” cioè la concezione del mondo assorbita acriticamente dai vari ambienti sociali
in cui si sviluppa l’individualità morale dell’uomo medio. Il senso comune non è una concezione unica, identica
nel tempo e nello spazio: esso è il “folklore” della filosofia, e come il folclore si presenta in forme innumerevoli:
il suo carattere fondamentale è di essere una concezione del mondo disgregata, incoerente, inconseguente,
conforme al carattere delle moltitudini di cui esso è la filosofia. (Quaderni 1045)
[is the “philosophy of nonphilosophers”—in other words, the conception of the world acritically absorbed from
the various social environments in which the moral individuality of the average person is developed. Common
sense is not a single conception, identical in time and place. It is the “folklore” of philosophy, and, like folklore,
it appears in countless forms. The fundamental characteristic of common sense consists in its being a
disjointed, incoherent, and inconsequential conception of the world that matches the character of the
multitudes whose philosophy it is. (Prison Notebooks. II, 333)]

Trumpian populism appropriates the discourse of the Tea Party, whose populist dimension was rooted
in American society: “the populist message of the Tea Party resonated with so many. The various Tea
Parties are the product both of top-down and bottom-up populism” (Gramsci’s Common 187). Following
the Gramscian approach, Crehan analyzes the way in which populism is constituted as an internal
articulation of senso comune: “rather than arguing about whether or not the Tea Party phenomenon is
inauthentic, Astroturf populism, progressives need to trace out, as Formisano, and Skocpol and
Williamson do, the common sense that the Tea Party draws from and helps to create” (Gramsci’s
Common 187).
Nonetheless, the reference to senso comune can be clarified better by introducing another Gramscian
concept that Crehan uses: buon senso,— “il nucleo sano del senso comune,” “ciò che appunto potrebbe
chiamarsi buon senso e che merita di essere sviluppato e reso unitario e coerente (Quaderni 1380)
[“the healthy nucleus that exists in ‘common sense,’” the part “which deserves to be made more unitary
and coherent” (Gramsci, Selections from Prison 328)]. Senso comune is configured, if opposed to buon
senso, as a privileged space for the articulation of passive revolutions. Senso comune, in fact,
is not only a site of struggle for those trying to transform society. Dominant classes (who in their rise to power
constituted their own historical bloc) may have the resources necessary to ensure that their worldview remains
dominant—this is part of what defines hegemony—but their dominance is never completely won, never totally
secure. It must be continually maintained and reproduced. This does not mean, however, the creation of new
narratives by new organic intellectuals, but rather the effective dissemination of already existing narratives,
recrafted to resonate with the concerns of a given historical moment. The simple, assessable common sense,
on which such dissemination relies, remains rooted in the foundational narratives forged by the organic
intellectuals the dominant class created in its rise to power. We can see the Tea Party phenomenon as an
example of the effective dissemination of common sense, grounded in some old capitalist verities, which at a

Yuri Brunello, "‘Passive Revolutions’ after the Crisis of Globalization: Gramsci
and the Current Culture of Populism"
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23.2 (2021): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss2/5>
Special Issue: A Return to the Bad Old Times. Ed. Fabio Akcelrud Durão and Fernando Urueta

page 4 of 12

particular historical moment resonated particularly strongly with certain section of the American public.
(Gramsci’s Common 119)

Crehan captures all the ambivalence of the Gramscian notion of senso comune, which contains the
counterpoint of buon senso. Organic intellectuals in a progressive class have the opportunity to operate
dialogically with subalterns, whose knowledge can be transformed in democratic ways, with buon senso
as a basis. On the contrary, the populist “passive revolution” reconfigures the senso comune of a
particular society, without profoundly changing power relations.
3. A Historical Example of Revolution-Restoration: Pirandello’s Literary Subversivism
If we consider a historically realized passive revolution, namely fascism, and analyze it according to the
methods indicated by Crehan, we must recognize in the modernist Luigi Pirandello one of the most
illustrious Italian representatives of the “revolution without revolution” realized in the artistic field.
Although he had produced several texts in the Sicilian dialect for the popular actor Angelo Musco,
Pirandello, as part of the fascist culture, represented a sophisticated and experimental line. Gramsci had
found a subversive modernism in Pirandello’s theater as early as the 1910s, when he was a theater critic
and defined Pirandello’s texts as “tante bombe a mano che scoppiano nei cervelli degli spettatori e
producono crolli di banalità, rovine di sedimenti di pensiero” (La smorfia 51) [“so many hand grenades
that explode in the brains of the spectators, bringing down banalities, wrecking feelings and ideas”
(Selections from Cultural 83)].
In 1924, Pirandello was an internationally consecrated writer. The play Sei personaggi in cerca
d’autore had already been brought to stages in London, Paris, and New York. In September Pirandello
publicly took sides in defense of Benito Mussolini, as the fascist leader was at the center of an intense
political crisis, standing accused of being involved in the killing of the opposition deputy Giacomo
Matteotti. The same year Pirandello took over the direction of Teatro d’Arte, housed in Palazzo
Odescalchi in Rome. The scholar Patricia Gaborik writes about the debut of Teatro d’Arte in April 1925,
a few days before the release of the Manifesto degli Intellettuali Fascisti, which Pirandello signed: “Oltre
agli spettacoli, la serata si annunciava già come un importante evento mondano. ‘Non si danno recite
popolari’, aveva dichiarato Pirandello e il pubblico intervenuto alla prima contava effetivamente il meglio
dell’alta società di allora (533) [“In addition to the performances, the event seemed important. ‘Popular
performances will not be performed,’ Pirandello declared, and the audience attending the debut actually
included the elites of high society of the time,” (our translation)].
Pirandello will receive a public grant for his aesthetic and entrepreneurial project, with the aid of the
fascist government, i.e. of the Italian state. Despite receiving state funding, the stage at Palazzo
Odescalchi ensured that “popular performances are not performed.” The Pirandellian revolution proves
to be an aristocratic, elitist experience. Teatro d’Arte has a public inspiration, but not a democratic
finality. A “passive revolution” takes place in the context of artistic production: engagement in the
project is governmental, but certainly not popular. It is a revolution without revolution carried out by
traditional intellectuals to the benefit of society’s elites, using public funds to alienate the masses from
the theater and imbue the space with an exclusive prestige.
According to Gramsci, Pirandello’s limitation is precisely that he is not an organic intellectual:
Pirandello è criticamente un “paesano” siciliano che ha acquisito certi caratteri nazionali e certi caratteri
europei, ma che sente in se stesso questi tre elementi di civiltà come giustapposti e contradditori. Da questa
esperienza gli è venuto l’atteggiamento di osservare le contraddizioni nelle personalità degli altri e poi
addirittura di vedere il dramma della vita come il dramma di queste contraddizioni. (La smorfia 83-84)
[Pirandello is critically a Sicilian ‘villager’ who has acquired certain national and European traits, but who feels
these three elements of civilization to be juxtaposed and contradictory within himself. Rooted in this
experience is his attitude of observing the contradictions in other people’s personalities and then of actually
seeing the drama of life as the drama of these contradictions. (Selections from Cultural 145)]

Pirandello is a critic of senso comune, but pars destruens is not accompanied by a pars construens,
that is Pirandello’s theater does not create a new senso comune. It is chaotically split between dialectal,
national, and European identity. Pirandello combines and subverts these three identities. The problem
is that he proves incapable of producing a new and coherent discursive formation. In the Pirandellian
theater, the feeling of an organic crisis is prevalent, but—to quote a Gramscian formula referring to De
Sanctis—“masse di sentimenti rappresentati artisticamente” (Quaderni 2188) [“the mass of artistically
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represented feelings” (Selections from Cultural 94)] lacks “coerenza logica e storico-attuale” (Quaderni
2188) [“logical, historical, and topical coherence” (Selections from Cultural 94)].
It is easy for fascism to exploit the Pirandellian deconstruction of senso comune in a reactionary
direction (revolution-restoration). Pirandello himself in 1923 had interpreted his aesthetic project and
the government action of fascism within a common vitalist and irrationalist perspective. He had written
in a contribution to the newspaper “L’Idea Nazionale” that Mussolini can only be blessed
da uno che ha sempre sentito questa immanente tragedia della vita, la quale per consistere in qualche modo
ha bisogno d’una forma; ma subito, nella forma in cui consiste, sente la morte; perché dovendo e volendo di
continuo muoversi e mutare, in ogni forma si vede come imprigionata, e vi urge dentro e vi tempesta e la
logora e alla fine ne evade: Mussolini che così chiaramente mostra di sentire questa doppia e tragica necessità
della forma e del movimento, e che con tanta potenza vuole che il movimento trovi in una forma ordinata il
suo freno, e che la forma non sia mai vuota, idolo vano, ma dentro accolga pulsante e fremente la vita, per
modo che essa ne sia di momento in momento ricreata e pronta sempre all’atto che la affermi a se stessa e
la imponga agli altri. (Saggi 1249)
[by somebody who has always felt the immanent tragedy of life, which, in order to exist in some way, requires
a form, but which senses death in any form it assumes. For, since it is subject to continual change and motion,
it feels itself imprisoned in any form. It rages and storms inside it and finally escapes from it. Mussolini has
clearly shown that he is aware of this double and tragic necessity of movement and form, and hopes to
conciliate the two. Form must not be a vain and empty idol. It must receive life, pulsating and quivering, so
that it should be forever recreated and ready for the act which affirms itself and imposes itself on others.
(Hamilton 47)]

The search for a consensus obtained through emotionality—rather than through the critical exercise of
rationality—is one of the characteristics of the organization of culture and its narratives in the context
of passive revolutions. Analyzing the reconfiguration of senso comune in emotional and irrational terms,
Crehan explains Trump’s success by arguing that
effective politicians, of both left and right, draw on pre-existing elements within the heterogeneous confusion
that is common sense to create narratives that are emotionally powerful while reflecting ‘realities’ their
supporters recognize. Before hearing what seems such common sense truth, they would have been hard put
to articulate it, but now it seems no more than what they already knew. Trump’s rhetoric with its
transformation of immigrants, Muslims, the media, and above all Hillary Clinton, into figures of hate, explains
to his supporters in an emotionally convincing way, why they feel they are losing their country, while holding
out the promise that he, Trump, will take it back for them. (The Common 288–289)

In short, the passive revolution embodied by Trump allows many social groups of the old order to
maintain cultural and political hegemony over American society through the new populist narrative.
4. Is Gramsci a sovereignist?
Crehan uses Gramscian concepts to interpret the Tea Party experience or Trumpist populism and her
training as an anthropologist pushes her to carry out rigorous systematization. Crehan, for example, is
perfectly aware of the fact that the point of view on culture present in Prison Notebooks is the result of
a rich and multifaceted path. It ranges from an initial notion of culture—as the January 1916 article
Socialismo e cultura shows—“defined as the work of self-knowledge” (Culture 76) and passes through
reflections on art and literature intended as the organization and development of an “embryonic
proletarian culture” (Culture 74), a new paradigm, which came to maturity in January 1921, when
Gramsci publishes Marinetti rivoluzionario?, where he writes:
Una fabbrica, passata dal potere capitalista al potere operaio, continuerà a produrre le stesse cose materiali che
oggi produce. Ma in qual modo e in quali forme nasceranno le opere di poesia, del dramma, del romanzo, della
musica, della pittura, del costume, del linguaggio? Non è una fabbrica materiale quella che produce queste
opere […]. Cosa resta a fare? Niente altro che distruggere la presente forma di civiltà (2017, 112). Having
passed from capitalist power to workers’ power, the factory will continue to produce the same material things
that it produces today. But in what way and under what forms will poetry, drama, the novel, music, painting,
and moral and linguistic works be born? It is not a material factory that produces these works […]. What
remains to be done? Nothing other than to destroy the present form of civilization. (Selections from Cultural
50–51)

Gramsci imagines proletarian civilization, within a future liberated society, as the result of a rupture
with the culture of the bourgeoisie and as the result of radical voluntarism. Prison Notebooks innovates
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these pre-prison theoretical positions. Refusing the existence of “autonomous, purely cultural ‘systems,’”
what Gramsci “is ultimately concerned with in mapping out what persists, and what does not, is the
persistence, change, or transformation not of ‘conceptions of the world’ in themselves, but of the basic
power relations of which such conceptions are, to use Gramscian terminology, an organic part” (Crehan,
Culture 87).
The monograph Antonio Gramsci. La passione di essere nel mondo suggests that the Gramscian
vision of culture considered for our present is limited to the first period of Gramscian reflections on
culture. The author is a scholar, Diego Fusaro, who is also a sovereignist militant. Fusaro is an activist
and a supporter—not of Trump or the Tea Party—but of Italian sovereignist populism. It should be
remembered that the popularity of sovereignism in Italy is a relatively recent fact, following the crisis
of Italian neoliberalism. To understand the decline among the right of neoliberalism and the rise of
sovereignism, it is necessary to go back to 1994. This was the year of Berlusconi’s first electoral victory
in Italy, a phenomenon which, despite its enormous repercussion, does not constitute an episode of
rupture.
Berlusconi’s terms of government (1994–1995; 2001–2006; 2008–2011) guarantee the continuity
of a political, economic, and cultural process in force for over a decade: the Italian version of the
conservative revolution of Reagan and Thatcher. In the eighties and nineties neoliberalism spread as a
phase of strong “modernization” in republican and anti-fascist Italy, characterized politically and
culturally, since the proclamation of the 1946 Constitution, by policies of massive state intervention and,
more or less markedly, social-democratic government. The sociologist Massimiliano Panerari has
described very well what the advent of neoliberalism has meant in cultural terms for Italy: the loss of
cultural hegemony by the left and the birth of a hegemony which he defines as “subcultural” developed
by a center and a left that qualified themselves as reformists. In the 1980s, Panerari writes, the left
loses its supremacy in the field of culture:
Nel giro di un decennio, quello dell’edonismo reaganiano, tutti si convinsero improvvisamente che era giunto
il momento di spassarsela. Parola d’ordine: “Ci vogliamo divertire,” e, per cortesia, si eviti di ammorbare
l’esistenza, in qualunque modo, con la politica, la cultura, l’economia, e tutte queste “robe” [...]. E fu chiaro
[…] che l’egemonia non nasceva più in fabbrica, come predicava Gramsci negli anni Trenta, ma stava
prendendo forma all’interno degli studi di una televisione completamente diversa da quella in bianco e nero:
la televisione della pubblicità e degli show con le ballerine scosciate (L’egemonia)
[Within a decade, that of Reaganite hedonism, everyone suddenly became convinced that the time had come
for a good time. The keyword: ‘We want to have fun,’ and, please, avoid boring us, in any way, with politics,
culture, economy, and all that ‘stuff’ [...]. And it was clear […] that hegemony was no longer born in the
factory, as Gramsci preached in the thirties, but it was taking shape inside the studios of a completely different
television from the black and white one: the advertising and television shows with the sensual dancers,” (our
translation)].

For fifteen years the Italian right, led by the liberal Berlusconi with the support of the post-fascist
Alleanza Nazionale and the populist party Lega Nord, has put this hegemonic project into practice (not
cultural, but “subcultural”), implementing a crypto-Gramscian strategy.
When at the beginning of the 2010s the economic and financial crisis dramatically called on Italy and
neoliberalism to reveal all its contradictions, Berlusconi's political proposal, which had been hegemonic
for over a decade in the context of the Italian right, sank. Coming to the aid of the right (and bourgeois
liberalism), allowing it to renew itself culturally, sovereignism emerged on an international scale, not
only in the form of the so-called Tea Party, but also as the victorious Brexit and Donald Trump campaigns
of 2016. Post-fascists, as well as populists and northern autonomists, discover in sovereignism the
opportunity to question neoliberalism, without having to question the market, as long as it is a national
one. The large-scale appropriation of the right of the sovereignist tactic is rapid, also because, in the
perspective of sovereignism, capitalism and the market are not harmful in themselves, but are unfair
and oppressive because of the predominance of finance and speculation, identified in the supranational
European Union. In short, the field of the sovereign struggle is the economic “globalism,” which is an
enemy of idealized local and autonomous communities. The political dichotomy between right and left
is abandoned. A significant part of the right no longer identifies itself as rightist, but chooses national
sovereignty as its flag. Gramsci is back in vogue among the new right, but this time use of Gramscian
thought is explicit. The reference to Gramscian texts, as well as to the writings of Ezra Pound (or of
more recent authors, such as Alain Finkielkraut and Michel Onfray), shows how the sovereignists propose
a discourse that transcends left-wing and rightist politics, uniting them in the same anti-globalist and
communitarian struggle.
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Among the Italian parties that have renewed themselves, or that are born from the post-Berlusconi
sovereignist wave, there is Vox Italia, founded by Fusaro and appreciated also by the nationalist party
Fratelli d’Italia and by the Lega Nord, a populist political formation. Fusaro is author of several
monographs on Marxism, idealist philosophy, and populism. He theorizes that there will be conflict
between communitarianism and globalism. Thanks to his constant presence in the media, such as radio,
television, and newspapers, which has allowed him to reach a large audience and high popularity ratings,
Fusaro’s visibility in Italy is considerable. His appeal to Gramsci is systematic, both in his radio and
television appearances and in academic contexts.
Antonio Gramsci. La passione di essere nel mondo is totally focused on Gramsci. Fusaro proposes
making “un tentativo di attraversare alcuni luoghi e alcuni plessi teorici della sua opera portandoli in
tensione con il nostro presente” (2015, 17) [“an attempt to cross some places and some theoretical
plexuses of [Gramsci’s] work to bring them into tension with the present,” (our translation)]. The study
intends to answer the question “che cosa direbbe oggi Gramsci se fosse vivo?”(2015, 17) [“what would
Gramsci have to say today if he were alive?,” (our translation)]. Thus we learn that Gramsci's answer
to the Italian crisis, according to Fusaro, would be populist sovereignism, as we read in the chapter that
concludes the book, Ripartire da Gramsci:
Il marxismo eterodosso di Gramsci, del resto, ci permette anche di ripensare in forma alternativa il processo
di emancipazione, abbandonando quell’internazionalismo che, oggi, diventa il semplice raddoppiamento
caricaturale del processo della mondializzazione capitalistica. Tra i principali meriti teorici dei Quaderni figura,
senz’altro, quello di aver impostato in forma originale il nesso tra nazionale e internazionale, intendendo il
secondo come necessariamente mediato dal primo. (Antonio Gramsci 136)
[“Moreover, Gramsci's heterodox Marxism also allows us to rethink the emancipation process in an alternative
way, abandoning that internationalism which, today, becomes the simple caricatural doubling of the process
of capitalist globalization. Among the main theoretical merits of Prison Notebooks there is, of course, that of
having set up in an original form the connection between national and international, whereby the latter is
necessarily mediated by the former,” (our translation)].

In short, Fusaro chooses a perspective, which leads him to favor the notion of the national-popular
developed by Gramsci in Prison Notebooks:
In Italia il termine “nazionale” ha un significato molto ristretto ideologicamente e in ogni caso non coincide
con “popolare,” perché in Italia gli intellettuali sono lontani dal popolo, cioè dalla “nazione” e sono invece
legati a una tradizione di casta, che non è mai stata rotta da un forte movimento politico popolare o nazionale
dal basso: la tradizione è “libresca” e astratta e l’intellettuale tipico moderno si sente più legato ad Annibal
Caro o Ippolito Pindemonte che a un contadino pugliese o siciliano. Il termine corrente “nazionale” è in Italia
legato a questa tradizione intellettuale e libresca, quindi la facilità sciocca e in fondo pericolosa di chiamare
“antinazionale” chiunque non abbia questa concezione archeologica e tarmata degli interessi del paese
(Quaderni 2116)
[In Italy the term “national” has an ideologically very restricted meaning, and it does not in any case coincide
with “popular” because in Italy the intellectuals are distant from the people, i.e. from the “nation.” They are
tied instead to a caste tradition that has never been broken by a strong popular or national political movement
from below. This tradition is abstract and “bookish,” and the typical modern intellectual feels closer to Annibal
Caro or Ippolito Pindemonte than to an Apulian or Sicilian peasant. The current term “national” is connected
in Italy to this intellectual and bookish tradition. Hence the foolish and ultimately dangerous facility of calling
“anti-national” whoever does not have this archaeological and moth-eaten conception of the country’s
interests. (Selections from Cultural 208-209)]

In Fusaro’s effort to update Gramsci, the category of “national-popular” acquires a particular value:
la neutralizzazione della volontà nazionale-popolare e di quel pur contraddittorio primato della politica
sull’economia tipico dello stato sovrano e dello jus publicum europaeum ha costituito un passaggio obbligato
per la spoliticizzazione dell’economia e per l’imporsi dell’odierna dittatura del finanz-capitalismo. (Antonio
Gramsci 137)
[the neutralization of the national-popular will and of that contradictory primacy of politics on the economy
typical of the sovereign state, and the jus publicum europaeum has constituted an obligatory step toward the
depoliticization of the economy and the imposition of today’s dictatorship of financial capitalism, (our
translation)].
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By updating the Gramscian thought, therefore, Fusaro finds a continuity between the fascist dictatorship
and what is qualified as the dictatorship of the European Union:
la declinazione gramsciana del nesso dialettico tra nazionale e internazionale può fecondamente essere
metabolizzata e, di più, costituisce una preziosissima risorsa simbolica per pensare criticamente e agire
conseguentemente al cospetto dell’ordine spoliticizzato con dominio assoluto del capitale finanziario
pudicamente chiamato ‘Unione Europea.’ (Antonio Gramsci 137)
[the Gramscian declension of the dialectical link between the national and international can be fruitfully
metabolized and, moreover, used as precious symbolic resource to think critically and act consequently in the
presence of the depoliticized order with absolute domination of the financial capital modestly called the
‘European Union,’ (our translation)].

Fusaro is even more explicit in another passage of the volume:
L’Unione Europea corrisponde, avrebbe detto Gramsci, a una “rivoluzione passiva” – dunque affine, nella sua
essenza, al fascismo e all’americanismo – con cui i dominanti, dopo il 1989, hanno stabilizzato il nesso di forza
capitalistico, rimuovendo la forza che ancora in parte lo contrastava (lo stato sovrano, con primato del
politico). Si è trattato, gramscianamente, di una rivoluzione passiva anche per il fatto che, al pari di quella
risorgimentale, non ha visto l’attiva partecipazione delle classi subalterne (Antonio Gramsci 137)
[The European Union corresponds, Gramsci would have said, to a ‘passive revolution’—therefore similar in its
essence to fascism and Americanism—through which the dominants, after 1989, stabilized the nexus of
capitalist force, removing the force that still partially contrasted with it (the sovereign state, with the primacy
of the politician). It was, using Gramscian concepts, a passive revolution also due to the fact that, like the
Risorgimento, it did not see the active participation of the subordinate classes, (our translation)]

Fusaro uses the category of passive revolution to indicate that broader global movement, of which
the current “subcultural hegemony” represents an articulation and against which it is necessary to
redeem the “potenza statale come forza in grado di disciplinare l’economico e di aprire uno spazio in cui
la decisione sovrana della comunità democratica possa imporsi” (Antonio Gramsci 139) [“state power
as a force capable of regulating the economy and opening a space where the sovereign decision of the
democratic community can impose itself,” (our translation)]. According to Fusaro’s thesis, the nationalpopular strategy would today play a decisive role due to its particular practical urgency.
5. Gramsci as Neoidealist
Fusaro’s exegesis presents a problem. It overturns the Gramscian perspective. As Fusaro himself
acknowledges, in fact, Gramsci understands the international as necessarily mediated by the national.
Fusaro is, however, convinced that, if he were alive today, Gramsci would reverse this prospect: the
national would be mediated by the international. However, it should not be forgotten that the Gramscian
“national-popular” is a process of integration of the people and the nation, which reconfigures the
conceptions of the latter and the former as articulated within the fascist narrative. In Prison Notebooks,
Gramsci reflects on the national-popular during the phase of the greatest consensus known by fascism.
As the poet and literary theorist Edoardo Sanguineti has rightly observed, Gramsci’s vision of the
national-popular is constituted in marked opposition to fascist nationalism and populism. In the context
of this antagonism Gramsci elaborates the concept of the “national-popular,” aiming to capture, “in una
strenua lotta contro nazionalismo e populismo, particolarmente nei modi in cui questi venivano coltivati
e gestiti dalla cultura del regime fascista, quanto poteva essere ritorto, strappandolo all’egemonia del
potere, contro quel potere medesimo” (205) [“in a strenuous struggle against nationalism and populism,
particularly in the ways in which these were cultivated and managed by the culture of the fascist regime,
how much could be twisted snatching it from the hegemony of power, against that power itself,” (our
translation)].
The national-popular strategy lays the foundations for new narratives, capable of opening up new
spaces, within which it is possible to build a democratic and mass culture, on the horizon, Sanguineti
claims, of Weltliteratur and global culture. The concept is clearly opposite to that of Gramsci as imagined
by Fusaro, who—starting from the international—would return to the national:
oggi il punto di partenza nazionale è chiamato a costituire la base per la costruzione di un universalismo
alternativo (“lo sviluppo è verso l’internazionalismo”: [...]) alla “cattiva universalità” della globalizzazione,
generalizzazione planetaria degli egoismi acquisitivi e predatori. Con Gramsci, la lotta nazionale contro
l’internazionalismo della globalizzazione dei mercati e della finanza acquista lo statuto di medium in vista
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dell’unificazione del genere umano, che “diventa sempre più un universale concreto, storicamente concreto.”
(Antonio Gramsci 139)
[today the national starting point is called to constitute the basis for the construction of an alternative
universalism (“the development is towards internationalism:” […]) to the ‘bad universality’ of globalization,
planetary generalization of acquisitive and predatory selfishness. With Gramsci, the national struggle against
the internationalism of the globalization of markets and finance acquires the status of medium in view of the
unification of mankind, which “becomes increasingly concrete, historically concrete,” (our translation)].

The path would proceed from the international to the national and then from the local level it would
move to a wider universal dimension, that of a harmoniously reconciled humanity.
The actualization of Gramscian thought proposed by Fusaro is not materialistic. On the contrary, it
reveals a strong voluntarism, which is unsurprising. In Fusaro’s view, in fact, Gramsci is unequivocally
an idealist: in Gramsci “resta oggi vivo più che mai quello che, con una grammatica liberamente desunta
da Vico, potremmo qualificare come il ‘comunismo ideale eterno’” (Antonio Gramsci 140) [“what we
could qualify as the 'ideal eternal communism,' with a grammar freely deduced from Vico, remains alive
today,” (our translation)]. What moves Gramsci's theoretical activity is, concludes the Fusaro’s chapter,
using a metaphor from Gramsci himself— the “rosa dell’Ideale, ancora oggi non realizzato, di dare a
tutti la libertà, tramite la forza della giustizia e di un agire appassionato” (142) [“rose of the Ideal, still
unrealized today, of giving everyone freedom, by force of justice and to act passionately,” (our
translation)].
This interpretation of Gramsci as an exponent of Italian idealism, together with Benedetto Croce and
Giovanni Gentile, moves from an assumption, that is, the presence of “un tratto costante” (2015, 27)
[“a constant trait”] in Gramscian thought: Gramsci – “tanto nella sua fase precarceraria, quanto in quella
della stesura dei Quaderni – intende la cultura come il fondamento del costituirsi del soggetto
rivoluzionario, come la via da percorrere affinché esso diventi ‘in sé e per sé,’ cosciente di sé e dei propri
compiti storici.” (2015, 27) [“both in its pre-prison production and in that of the drafting of Prison
Notebooks,” Gramsci understands culture “as the foundation of the establishment of the revolutionary
subject, as the way to go so that it becomes ‘in-itself and for-itself,’ conscious of itself and its historical
tasks,” (our translation)].
The argument is clear and shows how Fusaro takes into consideration, when proposing a modern
adaptation of Gramsci, a unique concept of culture, more precisely of the view of culture developed in
Gramsci’s early works. Fusaro elevates such conception to the essential meaning of Gramsci's reflections
on the theme of culture:
In quanto “disciplina ad un ideale,” la cultura è il fattore decisivo dell’organizzazione operaia. Essa permette
ai proletari di rivelarsi a se stessi. In questo senso, la cultura è, socraticamente, una maieutica, un “conosci
te stesso” rivolto alla classe operaia, di modo che quest’ultima – secondo l’hegelismo che informa di sé l’intera
riflessione gramsciana – acquisti lo statuto dell’inseità e della perseità. Il tema hegelo-marxiano
dell’acquisizione dell’autocoscienza nel conflitto viene da Gramsci declinato nel senso dell’acquisizione della
cultura (Antonio Gramsci 27-28)
[As ‘discipline to an ideal,’ culture is the decisive factor of the workers’ organization. It allows proletarians to
reveal themselves. In this sense, culture is, Socratically, a maieutic, a ‘know yourself” addressed to the
working class, so that the latter—according to the Hegelism that informs the whole of Gramscian reflection—
acquires the status of inseity and perseity. The Hegelian-Marxian theme of the acquisition of selfconsciousness in the conflict is by Gramsci conceived in the sense of the acquisition of culture, (our
translation)].

The idea of culture considered as “disciplina ad un ideale” (Gramsci, Masse 58) [“discipline in striving
for an ideal” (Gramsci, The Gramsci Reader 59)] is found in Socialismo e cultura, where culture is defined
as
organizzazione, disciplina del proprio io interiore, è presa di possesso della propria personalità, è conquista di
coscienza superiore, per la quale si riesce a comprendere il proprio valore storico, la propria funzione nella
vita, i propri diritti e i propri doveri (Masse 57)
[organization, discipline of one’s inner self, a coming to terms with one’s own personality; it is the attainment
of a higher awareness, with the aid of which one succeeds in understanding one’s own historical value, one’s
own function in life, one’s own rights and obligations (The Gramsci 57)].

Yuri Brunello, "‘Passive Revolutions’ after the Crisis of Globalization: Gramsci
and the Current Culture of Populism"
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 23.2 (2021): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol23/iss2/5>
Special Issue: A Return to the Bad Old Times. Ed. Fabio Akcelrud Durão and Fernando Urueta

page 10 of 12

The limits of this operation are evident. Just look at how Fusaro reads the relationship between Gramsci
and Pirandello in Prison Notebooks. As we have seen, for Gramsci, Pirandello’s problem is the inability
to subvert the senso comune of fascist Italy, strengthening its—irrational, subjective—aesthetic. Fusaro
does not evoke the question, even remotely. According to Fusaro, Pirandello’s fragility would consist in
the inability to popularly spread anti-positivist subjectivism. “Le coppie dicotomiche ‘vecchio-nuovo’ e
‘distruzione-creazione’” (Antonio Gramsci 117) [“The dichotomous pairs ‘old-new’ and ‘destructioncreation’”] would constitute “categorie capitali dell’estetica dei Quaderni” (117) [“capital categories of
Prison Notebook’s aesthetics”]. Fusaro adds, in Pirandello
la dialettica tra le due coppie dicotomiche poc’anzi menzionate trova, probabilmente, nell’analisi dell’opera di
Pirandello la propria applicazione più felice. Per un verso, Pirandello rappresenta la distruzione del vecchio
costume teatrale e della mentalità positivistica e cattolica tramite una feconda – sia pure condotta al grado
iperbolico del relativismo – opera di deoggettivazione dell’esistente in direzione del momento soggettivo. Per
un altro verso, l’opera teatrale pirandelliana (eccezion fatta per Liolà, il testo preferito da Gramsci) è intessuta
di elementi filosofico-intellettualistici che la rendono ancora troppo distante dalla vita nazionale-popolare delle
masse. (117)
[the dialectic between the two dichotomous couples mentioned above probably finds its happiest application
in the analysis of Pirandello’s work. On the one hand, Pirandello represents the destruction of the old theatrical
costume and of the positivistic and Catholic mentality through a fruitful—albeit conducted to the hyperbolic
degree of relativism—work of de-objectification of the extant in the direction of the subjective moment. On
the other hand, the Pirandellian theatrical work (except for Liolà, Gramsci’s favorite text) is woven with
philosophical-intellectual elements that make it still too distant from the national-popular life of the masses,
(our translation)].

Reading carefully the Gramscian considerations of Pirandello, it is easy to discover that the opposite is
true. Gramsci in Notebook 14 comes to praise Pirandellian humor, precisely because it was conceived
“con apporto minimo di carattere libresco.” (La smorfia 81) [“with a minimum contribution of a bookish
nature” (Selections from Cultural 144)] in its anti-subjectivist condition: “Sarebbe da vedere se nell’arte
del Pirandello non predomini l’umorismo, cioè l’autore non si diverta a far nascere certi dubbi ‘filosofici’
in cervelli non filosofici e meschini per ‘sfottere’ il soggettivismo e il solipsismo filosofico.” (La smorfia 81)
[“One should see whether humor is not the predominant element in Pirandello’s art, whether the author
does not amuse himself by raising certain ‘philosophical’ doubts in unphilosophical and narrow minds in
order to make fun of subjectivism and philosophical solipsism’” (Selections from Cultural 144)].
5. An Already Existing Narrative: Pretty Woman
In short, Fusaro’s intention, as an idealist, is to valorize “the subjective moment,” which would preside
over Gramsci's dynamics of praxis, accompanied by self-consciousness. Fusaro in the concluding chapter
writes:
“l solo modo per ereditare Gramsci, nel tempo del fanatismo dell’economia, è ripartire dal suo progetto
incompiuto, dal sogno desto di un’emancipazione garantita unicamente dalla costellazione composta da
autocoscienza, cultura e prassi trasformatrice. (Antonio Gramsci 129)
[The only way to inherit Gramsci, in the time of the fanaticism of the economy, is to start from its unfinished
project, from the lucid dream of an emancipation guaranteed only by the constellation composed of selfconsciousness, culture, and transformative praxis, (our translation)].

It is relevant Fusaro’s insistence on the idealist Gramsci and on a conception of culture as an experience
largely independent of the economy and politics, relegating the “organic” and articulated vision of culture
(the vision so well deepened by Crehan) to the margins.
The analysis of the project, characteristic of fascism, of reconfiguring senso comune, understood as
immediate perception, into aestheticizing terms (as compensation and replacement of political feeling
and understanding) is not only a prerogative of Gramsci, but a necessity to remember the
considerations, chronologically close to the Gramscian ones, developed by Walter Benjamin on the
aestheticization of politics (242). Reflecting on the dialectic between senso comune and buon senso,
Gramsci shows in a peculiar way and with surprising originality how based on common sense, the
subalterns and their intellectuals, using the tools of rationality and criticism of culture, can produce a
new philosophy. The process is, however, immanent and does not depend on abstract ideas or eternal
ideals. It originates within the formless mass of materials that cultures spread in the context of a society.
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In the final chapter of Antonio Gramsci: la passione di essere nel mondo there is a reference to
another volume by Fusaro, Il futuro è nostro. Filosofia dell'azione, in which the topicality of Gramsci’s
thought is affirmed, but from a sovereignist perspective and with an attachment to militant political
reality:
La larvata teleologia della logica di precarizzazione è orientata alla trasformazione – mediante l’inedita
“elaborazione forzata di un nuovo tipo umano,” per impiegare la formula utilizzata da Gramsci in relazione
all’americanismo – della precarietà in una dimensione naturale: e questo in modo che tutto (dal lavoro alla
professione, dai rapporti sentimentali a quelli esistenziali) diventi flessibile e precario. La disarticolazione delle
due istituzioni borghesi della scuola e della famiglia – promossa dalla struttura capitalistica e santificata dalla
sovrastruttura di sinistra e postmoderna – si inscrive in questa logica e, di più, ne segna il compimento. (Il
futuro 115)
[The larval teleology of the precaritizing logic is oriented towards the transformation—through the
unprecedented “forced elaboration of a new human type,” to employ the formula used by Gramsci in relation
to Americanism—of precarity in a natural dimension: and this in a way that everything (from work to
profession, from sentimental to existential relationships) becomes flexible and precarious. The disarticulation
of the two bourgeois institutions of school and family—promoted by the capitalist structure and sanctified by
the left and postmodern superstructure—is part of this logic and, moreover, marks its fulfillment. (our
translation)]

According to this particular interpretation of Italian populist sovereignism, Gramsci’s topicality would
consist in the possibility of obtaining a theoretical framework from Prison Notebooks and pre-prison
writings, which justifies a fight against financial capitalism aimed at restoring a civilization founded on
the values of the family and the homeland, “already existing narratives.” Fusaro observes that between
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—until 1968—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie converged in
the struggle against reification:
Il segreto della fase dialettica sta nell’unione della lotta del servo proletario con la coscienza infelice borghese
[…]. Nasce, per questa via, una reazione borghese al capitalismo o, se si preferisce, una borghesia
anticapitalistica che, in forza della coscienza infelice, lotta insieme con il servo in nome dell’emancipazione
universale. (Il futuro 261)
[the secret of the dialectic phase lies in the union of the struggle of the proletarian servant with the unhappy
bourgeois conscience [... ]. In this way, a bourgeois reaction to capitalism or an anti-capitalist bourgeoisie is
born which, by virtue of unhappy conscience, fights together with the servant in the name of universal
emancipation, (our translation)].

The national-popular character of Italian populist sovereignty postulates class conciliation within the
community space under the banner of resistance to financial capitalism. Industrial and productive
capitalism is spared from this battle. This is not surprising, since the idealism that underpins the vision
of culture of Fusaro’s sovereignism suggests an abstract idea of culture, destined to ignore the material
conditions of production that affect the aesthetic form. It is no coincidence that one of the artistic
products valued as most emblematic of the post-1968 anti-capitalist resistance is the film Pretty Woman
(1990), in which, according to Fusaro, “l’incompatibilità strutturale tra la donatività dell’eros e la rapacità
individualistica del capitale liquido-finanziario è efficacemente raffigurata, con forte impatto visivo.”
(2018, 63) [“the structural incompatibility between the donativeness of eros and the individualistic
rapacity of liquid-financial capital is effectively depicted, with a strong visual impact,” (our translation)].
The fact that Pretty Woman comes from a hyper-reified film production circuit does not matter. Nor
does it seem relevant that the actors’ style is clearly mimetic and the film openly commercial and
sentimentalist (and therefore fully included in the discursive field of senso comune). It is sufficient that
the film contains “the idea” of anti-“financial capitalism.” The distance from Gramsci’s broad anticapitalist conception is great. Gramsci’s critique of culture is in conflict with both financial and productive
capital and obsessively attentive to the bourgeois material conditions of production. We must not forget
what Gramsci wrote in 1919 about acting in the theater:
Il teatro, come organizzazione pratica di uomini e di strumenti di lavoro, non è sfuggito dalle spire del
maelström capitalistico. Ma l’organizzazione pratica del teatro è nel suo insieme un mezzo di espressione
artistica: non si può turbarla senza turbare e rovinare il processo espressivo, senza sterilire l’organo
‘linguistico’ della rappresentazione teatrale. (Gramsci, La smorfia 109)
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The theatre, as a practical organization of people and tools of trade, has not escaped from the coils of the
capitalist maelstrom. But the practical organization of the theatre as a whole is a means of artistic expression.
One cannot upset it without upsetting and ruining the expressive process, without sterilizing the ‘linguistic’
organ of the theatrical performance. (Gramsci, Selections from Cultural 68)]

There is no trace of idealism here, as there is no trace of the conceptual richness of Gramsci's thought
in Italian populist sovereignism, which qualifies as Gramscian.
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